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Abstract—There is a significant increase in the amount of
data breaches in corporate servers in the cloud environments.
This includes username and password compromise in the cloud
and account hijacking, thus leading to severe vulnerabilities of
the cloud service provisioning. Traditional authentication schemes
rely on the users to use their credentials to gain access to cloud
service. However once the credential is compromised, the attacker
will gain access to the cloud service easily.
This paper proposes a novel scheme that does not require the
user to present his credentials, and yet is able to prove ownership
of access to the cloud service using a variant of zero-knowledge
proof. A challenge-response protocol is devised to authenticate
the user, requiring the user to compute a one-time pad (OTP)
to authenticate himself to the server without revealing password
to the server. A prototype has been implemented to facilitate
the authentication of the user when accessing Dropbox, and
the experiment results showed that the overhead incurred is
insignificant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many business organizations now have a huge dependency
on cloud services for their daily operations. Increasingly, ter-
abytes of data are being stored in the cloud for ease of access,
thus providing 24/7 availability at any place and anytime.
This also makes file sharing a lot simpler, with a URL link,
users can now share a file or document in the cloud with
their colleagues and friends without requiring any validation
of credentials.
However, the convenience brought forth by cloud services
comes with a price, i.e., security. Convenience or security has
always been a battle of striking a balance, tools that make
our life simpler are often less secure, while technologies that
safeguard the system are generally inconvenient. Although
many cloud authentication schemes have been proposed [1],
since 2004, there has been an increasing amount of data
breaches [5], compromising the cloud service providers, user
credentials, and user’s confidential data in the cloud. With
users losing personal information, passwords and credit card
details, there is an increasing need to not only ensure security
but to also reduce and minimize the amount of information
leakage [7].
The current practise for accessing the cloud service is via
username and password authentication, which is prone to many
security attacks and vulnerabilities. Many users tend to use the
same password for multiple cloud services, if the password is
compromised, all user data hosted on these services will be
compromised as well [9]. Additionally, users typically choose
a password that is easy to remember, as randomly generated
passwords are just not memorizable. Although these random
passwords have higher entropy, they are not usable from the
user’s perspective.
This paper proposes a new approach to secure cloud
authentication using One-Time Pad (OTP). A trusted proxy
which serves as a mediator between the cloud service provider
and the client is responsbile for authenticating the client using
a challenge-response protocol. The client is not required to
use its PIN or password to authenticate itself, but using a two
secrets pre-shared with the client to compute a response to
the challenge posted by the proxy. In this way, neither the
user’s password nor its hash is transmitted via the network to
the server for authentication. This also minimizes the informa-
tion leakage on the communication channel. Furthermore, the
trusted proxy is not required to store users’ (salted or hashed)
passwords. Essentially, each challenge is unique, random and
not repeated, hence requiring a different response from the
client to be authenticated for each access request.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
related work, and Section III describes the system architecture
of the proposed proxy-based authentication scheme for cloud
services. In Section IV, we present the implementation details,
while Section V describes the evaluation results. Finally, we
conclude the paper with future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) [4] is commonly used
in the current cloud services to authenticate users. In addition
to the use of username and password, additional authentication
factors such as biometrics, voice and face recognition are used
to further ascertain the authenticity of the user. This is mainly
because these biometric traits are easy to provide and hard to
replicate. However, using biometrics and password at the same
time, demands more computational resources on the server
side, and registration of biometrics must be done. This also
leads to privacy issue as the clients may not be comfortable
with.
Fuzzy vault, digital signature, and zero-knowledge combi-
nation (FDZ) [8] first establishes a secure session between
the client and the server in order to derive a session key
using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol in combination
with RSA to prevent man-in-the-middle attack. Subsequently,
a fuzzy password scheme is employed in which the client is
asked to choose five out of seven images in order to authen-
ticate itself to the cloud server. If the user selects five images
correctly, he will be granted to access to server resources; in
other cases, the server will reject the authentication request.
[6] proposed an alternative to replace graphical passwords with
QR codes.
SeDiCi 2.0 [3], [2] uses Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) to
safeguard the user’s privacy, thus enabling the authentication
to take place without requiring the user to reveal its user name
and password. Therefore, it provides an improved solution for
phishing attempts. The technology also supports REST-based
API that enables taking advantage of the service by mobile
phones, web applications and other client applications. Instead
of requiring the user to carry a hardware token, a browser
plug-in must be installed in order to run SeDiCi.
III. OVERVIEW
This section describes the architectural overview of the
proposed authentication protocol.
Fig. 1. System Architecture of the cloud-based authentication protocol
As illustrated in Figure 1, we introduce a trusted proxy for
cloud services such as Dropbox, to handle authentication using
our novel challenge-response protocol that is based on prime-
number factorization. The system is first set-up by requiring
the client to authenticate itself to the cloud service using
the normal user-password authentication protocol, and then
requests for an access token. It then authorizes the trusted
proxy to mediate the authentication between himself and the
cloud service, by passing the access token to the trusted proxy.
In this one-time set-up phase, two secrets, which are randomly
generated large prime numbers are distributed to the client,
together with a client secret, to be stored in a secure storage.
A public composite number, which is the product of the two
prime numbers is stored in the trusted proxy to identify the
client. Knowing this composite number does not reveal any
information about the secret prime numbers.
Once this proxy-based cloud authentication has been set-
up, all subsequent authentication will not require the user to
transmit its username-password, but a security challenge will
be issued to the client based on the composite number, and a
residue computed based on the client’s secret. Only the correct
response which must be generated using the client’s secrets
will be accepted. The challenge is generated using a random
number that is 3072 bits long, and hence ensuring that each
access request is unique and will not be re-used. The database
is used to store the mapping of the public composite number
to the corresponding user account. Using this protocol, the
clients do not need to use their username-password to perform
authentication anymore.
The following sections describe the security requirements
to be achieved, the procedure of generating the security pa-
rameters and the details of the challenge-response protocol for
cloud authentication.
A. Security Requirements
This section outlines the security requirements for cloud
authentication.
• Transmission of password – the client must not be
required to transmit its password to the server for
authentication.
• Storing of password – the trusted proxy which me-
diates the authentication should not store the user’s
password, but only public information that even if it
is compromised, the client’s confidential credential is
not revealed.
• Secrets with high entropy1 – Access to the cloud
services should be based on secrets distributed to the
client, which have high entropy. A master password
maybe required to grant access to the client to retrieve
these secrets. Alternatively, the secrets may be stored
using a hardware token, e.g., a secure USB, that should
be in possession of the client.
B. Generation of Security Parameters
The security of system is based on large prime factoriza-
tion.
• Two large prime numbers (Pii, Pij) – are randomly
generated for each client. The generated prime num-
bers must be at least 1024-bit. These two primes form
two parts out of three of the client’s secret.
• Public composite numeer (Ni) – is a product of the
primes, Pii x Pij . Ni is public, and it is stored in the
database hosted by the trusted proxy.
• Secret (s) – is a randomly generated number that is co-
prime with the composite number Ni. s is generated
such that it is 1 < s < Ni. Essentially, s forms the
third part of the client’s secret.
• Residue (Ii) – is generated as Ii = s2 mod Ni.
Similarly, this residue is public, and it is known to
the trusted proxy and is used for verification of the
client’s secret, s.
The primes and the secret, (Pii, Pij , s) are distributed to the
client, and these secrets must be stored in a secure storage of
the client, while the public information (Ni, Ii) are distributed
to the trusted proxy, and they are mapped to the client’s cloud
service account for identification.
1The randomness collected by an operating system or application for use
in cryptography or other uses that require random data. This randomness is
often collected from hardware sources, either pre-existing ones such as mouse
movements or specially provided randomness generators.
Fig. 2. Challenge-Response Protocol for cloud authentication
C. Challenge-Response Authentication Protocol
Figure 2 shows the sequence diagram of the challenge-
response protocol for authenticating the clients. Assuming that
the client has been configured with the secrets, and the public-
information are mapped to the client’s account. When the client
requests to read/write/modify/download its files on the cloud
service, the trusted proxy generates a session challenge X with
the following:
X = y2 mod Ni (1)
where y is a random number per access request, and it is
typically 3072-bit.
Upon receiving the challenge, the client accesses its secrets,
and compute the following:
X∗ = r2 ×X mod Ni (2)
where r is also a randomly generated number with the same
length as y. Ni can be derived by multiplying the two secret
prime numbers in possession of the client. X* is then sent
back to the trusted proxy for verification. This serves as a
commitment of authentication for the access request.
The trusted proxy then generate a random β ∈ {0, 1}, in
order to verify the client. Depending on the value of β, the
client generates a different response to authenticate itself. If β
= 0, then the client returns the previously generated random
number, z = r. Conversely, if β = 1, the client computes:
z = r × s (3)
At the trusted proxy, the verification is performed depend-
ing on the value of β. When β = 0, it does not require the client
to use the third part of its secret, s, and by returning a correct
z = r is sufficient. This is because r which was committed as
part of X* must have been generated by the correct client that
possesses the authentic prime numbers (Pii, Pij). The trusted
proxy verifies z such that it satisfies the following equation:
X ×X∗ mod Ni = (z ×X)2 mod Ni (4)
Essentially, this is equivalent to y4 × r2 mod Ni.
On the other hand, if β = 1, this requires the client to use
the third part of its secret, s to compute the response z. The
received z must satisfy the folloiwng:
X∗ × Ii mod Ni = X × z2 mod Ni (5)
which results in y2 × r2 × s2 mod Ni.
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of the secure challenge-
response protocol, integrated with Dropbox in order to demon-
strate the feasibility of this new authentication for cloud
services. Dropbox was chosen as it provides a core API for
most of the functionalities needed to perform file upload and
download from the trusted proxy.
This prototype was implemented using Java, while the
trusted proxy was deployed as an RMI server. The functions
for generating the security parameters were implemented using
Fig. 3. GUI of a simple file upload/download client
Java Cryptographic library to generate secure random num-
bers, prime numbers, and big integer multiplications, modular
arithmetics and exponentiation.
The client secrets, i.e., two prime numbers and a random
secret, s were stored in a USB, protected with a password.
Whenever the client requests to access his files in Dropbox,
the client will be prompted to insert the USB containing the
secrets in order to complete the authentication process.
Using resource upload and download as our use case, we
have implemented a client GUI to facilitate these file oper-
ations using the proposed challenge-response authentication
protocol. Figure 3 shows the GUI of the client application.
V. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
In terms of performance, we measured the time taken to up-
load and download files of variable size to determine the per-
formance overhead incurred by the authentication performed
at the trusted proxy. We compared the total data transfer time
from the challenge-response protocol, data upload/download
with our proxy solution against the existing Dropbox solution.
The experiment results are listed in Table I and Table II.
Obviously, our solution is slower than the current Dropbox
solution for upload as shown in Table I, we observed that
by adding a challenge-response protocol for each file upload,
it incurred an overhead of 0.02 sec to 6 sec. Although the
performance is highly reliant on the network speed, we can
conclude that the overhead for having an additional step to
authenticate the client using our scheme is insignificant.
File Size Without Proxy With Proxy
100Kb JPG File 2.156 secs 2.178 secs
8.35Mb Audio File 7.706 secs 7.953 secs
33 Mb Flac Clip 16.844 secs 19.57 secs
127 Mb Video File 53.8 secs 59.223 secs
TABLE I. RESULTS OF UPLOAD SPEED
Similar results were recorded for resource download. As
shown in Table II, the performance between our system and
pure Dropbox solution is comparable.
An increase in uploading or download time per file will be
significant if the client were to be an enterprise user. Processing
more files drastically increases the processing time thus might
not be feasible. But our solution is scalable, we can add more
proxy nodes to perform the authentication in order to safeguard
the security of the cloud services.
File Size Without Proxy With Proxy
100Kb JPG File 1.608 secs 1.621 secs
8.35Mb Audio File 5.965 secs 5.982 secs
33 Mb Flac Clip 16.434 secs 20.917 secs
127 Mb Video File 54.023 secs 60.965 secs
TABLE II. RESULTS OF DOWNLOAD SPEED
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed a novel challenge-response proto-
col to authenticate clients that utilize cloud storage in a secure
and economical means. With the security concerns, we have
proposed an authentication scheme similar to OTP that is based
on prime factoring hard problem; we have also devised and
implemented a practical challenge-response protocol to allow
for each access request from the client to be authenticated
without requiring the client to transmit his password.
Through preliminary experiments, we have also shown that
the proposed solution incurs reasonable amount of overhead
and its performance can be scaled up by deploying multiple
proxy nodes, and this is particularly useful for meeting the re-
quirements of the enterprise tenants, where it can better support
performance oriented applications for large scale enterprises.
In the proposed system, the three part client secrets must be
stored in a secure manner. In the future, we plan to investigate
the protection of these secrets, for example using Bitlocker on
USB drive or file vault. Another interesting future work is to
look into secrets recoverability to ensure better usability of this
protocol.
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